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THE EQUITY PREMIUM IN FINANCE 






This paper is a revision of the recommendations about the equity premium found in the main 
finance and valuation textbooks. Herein, several editions of books written by authors such as, 
Brealey and Myers; Copeland, Koller and Murrin (McKinsey); Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe; Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus; Damodaran; Copeland and Weston; Van Horne; Bodie and Merton; Stowe 
et al.; Pratt; Penman; Bruner; Weston & Brigham; and Arzac, are revised. 
The aim is to highlight the confusing message of the textbooks regarding the equity premium 
and its evolution. 
The main confusion arises from not distinguishing among the four concepts that the word 
equity premium designates: Historical equity premium (HEP), Expected equity premium, 
Required equity premium (REP) and Implied equity premium (IEP). 
Some confusion also arises from not recognizing that although the HEP is equal for all investors, 
the REP, the EEP and the IEP are different for different investors. A unique IEP requires assuming 
homogeneous expectations for the expected growth (g), but there are several pairs (IEP, g) that 
satisfy current prices. We claim that different investors have different REPs and that it is 
impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, because it does not exist. 
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THE EQUITY PREMIUM IN FINANCE 




The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium 
and risk premium), is one of the most important, discussed but elusive parameters in finance. 
Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used to designate 
four different concepts: 
1.  Historical equity premium (HEP): historical differential return of the stock market over 
treasuries.  
2.  Expected equity premium (EEP): expected differential return of the stock market 
over treasuries. 
3.  Required equity premium (REP): incremental return of a diversified portfolio (the 
market) over the risk-free rate required by an investor.
1 It is needed for calculating 
the required return to equity (cost of equity). The CAPM assumes that REP and EEP are 
unique and that REP = EEP. 
4.  Implied equity premium (IEP): the required equity premium that arises from assuming 
that the market price is correct.  
The four concepts are different.
2 The HEP is easy to calculate and is equal for all investors,
3 but 
the  REP, the EEP and the IEP are different for different investors and are not observable 
magnitudes. A matter of big concern is the fact that, there is no an IEP for the market as a 
whole: different investors have different IEPs and use different REPs.
4 A unique IEP requires 
                                              
1 Or the extra return that the overall stock market must provide over the Government Bonds to compensate for the 
extra risk. 
2 We agree with Bostock (2004) when he says that “understanding the equity premium is largely a matter of using 
clear terms”. 
3 Provided they use the same time frame, the same market index, the same risk-free instrument and the same average 
(arithmetic or geometric). 
4 There is a required equity premium (REP) for each investor, but we cannot talk about a REP for the whole market. 
Similarly, for having a EEP common for al investors we need to assume homogeneous expectations and, with our 
knowledge of financial markets, this assumption is not reasonable.  
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assuming homogeneous expectations for the expected growth (g), but there several pairs (IEP, g) 
that satisfy current prices. 
The required equity premium (REP) is the answer to the following question: What incremental 
return do I require for investing in a diversified portfolio of shares (a stock index, for example) 
over the risk-free rate? It is a crucial parameter because the REP is the key to determining the 
company’s required return to equity and the required return to any investment project. 
An anecdote from Merton Miller (2000, page 3) about the expected market return in the Nobel 
context: “I still remember the teasing we financial economists, Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe, 
and I, had to put up with from the physicists and chemists in Stockholm when we conceded that 
the basic unit of our research, the expected rate of return, was not actually observable. I tried to 
tease back by reminding them of their neutrino – a particle with no mass whose presence was 
inferred only as a missing residual from the interactions of other particles. But that was eight 
years ago. In the meantime, the neutrino has been detected”. 
The historical equity premium is the historical average differential return of the market 
portfolio (usually a stock market index, such as the S&P 500) over the risk-free debt.
5 The most 
widely cited source is Ibbotson Associates whose U.S. database starts in 1926.
  Another 
frequently used source is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of 
Chicago. Table 1 contains the 1926-2005 average returns and HEP for the US according to 
Ibbotson Associates (2006), the most used source of historical data.
6  
Table 1. Returns and HEP of the US according to Ibbotson Associates (2006). 
1926-2005 
 Average  return  Standard  Serial 
Nominal Returns 1926-2005  Arithmetic Geometric deviation  correlation 
S&P 500  12.3%  10.4%  20.2%  3% 
Long-Term Gov. Bonds  5.8%  5.5%  9.2%  -8% 
T-Bills 3.8%  3.7%  3.1%  91% 
Inflation 3.1%  3.0%  4.3%  65% 
         
HEP over Gov. Bonds  6.5%  4.9%     
HEP over T-Bills  8.5%  6.7%     
 
The IEP is the implicit REP used in the valuation of a stock (or market index) that matches the 
current market value. The most widely used model to calculate the IEP is the dividend discount 
model. According to it, the current price per share (P0) is the present value of expected 
                                              
5 This difference can be calculated as an arithmetic average or geometric average. For the return of the risk-free debt, 
government bonds of different maturities may be used. A good discussion of the geometric and arithmetic average is 
Jacquier, Kane, and Marcus (2003). 
6 The HEP in Table 1 is the difference between the average return on the S&P 500 and the return of Gov. Bonds or 
T-Bills. However, Ibbotson Associates (2006, page 73), use as return for the risk-free rate instrument the income 
return (the portion of the total return that results from a periodic bond coupon payment) of the Gov. Bonds (5.2%) 
and consider that the relevant HEP during the period 1926-2005 is 7.1% (12.3-5.2).  
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dividends discounted at the required rate of return (Ke). If d1 is the dividend per share
7 expected 
to be received at time 1, and g the expected long term growth rate in dividends per share,  
P0 = d1 / (Ke - g), which implies:  Ke = d1/P0 + g.  IEP = Ke - RF     (1) 
But even if market prices are correct for all investors, there is not a REP common for all 
investors: there are many pairs (Ke, g) and (IEP, g) that accomplish equation (1). If equation (1) 
holds, the expected return for the shareholders is equal to the required return for the 
shareholders (Ke), but there are many required returns (as many as expected growths, g) in 
the market. On top of that, IEP and g change over time. 
We show that in the finance textbooks, there are authors that claim different identities among 
the four equity premiums defined above:
8 
•  There are many authors that claim that HEP = EEP = REP.
9  
•  Authors that claim that EEP is smaller than HEP.
10 
•  Authors that claim that there is a unique IEP and that REP = IEP.
11 
•  Authors that use a REP “for the sake of continuity with the previous version of the 
book”.
12 
•  Authors that “have no official position”.
13  
•  Authors that claim “that no one knows what the REP is”.
14 
•  Authors that claim that “it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a 
whole, because it does not exist”.
 15 
•  Authors that claim that “different investors have different REPs”.
16 
Section 2 is a revision of the advice of the main finance textbooks about the risk premium. 
Section 3 shows that here is no a REP for the market as a whole and that the markets cannot be 
characterized by a representative consumer. Section 4 explains which REP I use. Section 5 
concludes. 
  
                                              
7 That is for a company that pays to its shareholders only dividends. But if the company makes other payments to 
the equity holders (i.e. share repurchases), then the total equity cash flow per share should be considered. 
8 Fernandez (2006) revises also academic papers. 
9 For example: Brealey and Myers (1984, 1988, 1991, 1996); Copeland et al. (1990, 1995); Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 
(1988, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005); Stowe et al. (2002); Pratt (2002); Bruner (2004); Weston, Mitchel and Mulherin 
(2004); Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2003); Damodaran (1994, 2002, 2006); Ibbotson Associates (2006). 
10 For example: Copeland et al. (2000, REP = EEP = HEP-1.5-2%); Goedhart et al. (2005, REP = EEP = HEP-1-2%); 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1996, REP = EEP = HEP-1%). 
11 For example: Damodaran (2001a); Arzac (2005); Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2002);  
12 Damodaran (2001c), who adds: “and for purposes of saving a significant amount of reworking practice problems 
and solutions”. 
13 For example: Brealey and Myers (2000, 2003, 2005). 
14 For example: Penman (2003). 
15 For example: Fernandez (2002). 
16 For example: Fernandez (2004).  
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2. The equity premium in the textbooks 
Figure 1 collects the evolution of the Required Equity Premium (REP) used or recommended by 
the books. Looking at Figure 1 is easy to understand the confusion that students and 
practitioners (and finance authors, also) have about the Equity Premium. 
Table 2 contains the main conclusions about the Equity Premium in different editions of 
the books that we review in this section. 
The following sections contain the main messages about the equity premium conveyed in the 
finance textbooks and valuation books.  
Figure 1. Evolution of the Required Equity Premium (REP) used or recommended 
in the most important finance textbooks 
 
 
Table 2. Equity premiums recommended and used in textbooks 
Author(s) of the Textbook  Assumption  Period for HEP
REP 
recommended REP  used
Brealey and Myers          
2nd edition. 1984  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-81  8.3%  8.3% 
3rd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-85  8.4%  8.4% 
4th edition. 1991  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-88  8.4%  8.4% 
5th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills    8.2 - 8.5%    
6
th and 7
th edition. 2000 and 
2003  No official position    6 - 8.5%  8%  
8
th edition. 2005 (with Allen)  No official position    5 - 8.5%    
Copeland, Koller and Murrin 
(McKinsey)         
1
st edition. 1990  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-88  5 - 6%  6% 
2
nd edition. 1995  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-92  5 - 6%  5.5% 
3
rd edition. 2000  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1.5-2%  1926-98  4.5 - 5%  5% 
4
th edition. 2005. Goedhart, 
Koller & Wessels  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1-2%  1903-02  3.5 – 4.5%  4.8%  
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Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe           
2
nd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-88  8.5%  8.5% 
3
rd edition. 1993  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-93  8.5%  8.5% 
4
th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-94  8.5%  8.5% 
5
th edition. 1999  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-97  9.2%  9.2% 
6
th edition. 2002  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-99  9.5%  9.5% 
7
th edition. 2005  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-02  8.4%  8% 
Van Horne, 6
th edition. 1983        6% 
8
th edition. 1992      3 - 7%  5% 
Copeland and Weston (1979)        10% 
Copeland and Weston (1988)        10% 
Weston and Copeland (1992)        5% 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus          
2
nd edition. 1993  REP=EEP    6.5%   6.5% 
3
rd edition. 1996  REP=EEP=arith HEP vs. T-Bills - 1%    7.75%  7.75%  
5
th edition. 2002      6.5%   6.5% 
2003  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-01    5%; 8%  
Damodaran 1994 Valuation. 
1
st edition  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-90  5.5%  5.5% 
1996, 1997, 2001b, 2001c  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds    5.5%  5.5% 
2001a average  IEP  1970-00  4%  4% 
2002  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-00  5.51%  5.51% 
2006 Valuation. 2
nd edition  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-04  4.84%  4% 
Weston & Brigham (1982)      5-6%   
Weston, Chung and Siu 
(1997)     7.5%    
Bodie and Merton (2000)         8% 
Stowe et al. (2002)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-00  5.7%  5.7% 
Hawawini and Viallet (2002)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-99    6.2% 
Pratt (2002)  REP=EEP=HEP      7.4%, 8% 
Fernandez (2002)  “is impossible to determine the premium for the market as a whole”   
Penman (2003)  “No one knows what the REP is”      6% 
Fernandez (2001, 2004)  “different investors have different REPs”    4% 
Bruner (2004)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-00  6%  6% 
Weston, Mitchel & Mulherin 
(2004)  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-00  7.3%  7% 
Arzac (2005)  REP=IEP    5.08%  5.08% 
 
2.1. Brealey and Myers 
Brealey and Myers maintained that REP = EEP = HEP in their books until the 4
th edition. After 
that, they recognized that “Brealey and Myers have no official position on the exact market risk 
premium”.  
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In (1984, 2
nd edition, pages 119, 132) they used REP = EEP = HEP = 8.3%, the arithmetic HEP 
over T-Bills in the period 1926-1981 according to Ibbotson.
17 
In (1988, 3
rd edition, pages 126, 139, 140, 185), they used REP = EEP = HEP = 8.4%, the 
arithmetic HEP over T-Bills in the period 1926-1985 according to Ibbotson. 
In (1991, 4
th edition, page 131), they focused on the arithmetic HEP over T-Bills in the period 
1926-1988, which was 8.4%. They continued considering that REP = EEP = HEP and used 8.4% 
in their examples (pages 131, 194, 196). 
In (1996, 5
th edition), they suggested 8.2-8.5%. 
In (2000, 6
th edition, page 160), they recognized that “Brealey and Myers have no official 
position on the exact market risk premium, but we believe a range of 6 to 8.5% is reasonable 
for the United States. We are most comfortable with figures toward the upper end of the range”. 
Further on, on page 195, they say: “How about the market risk premium? From past evidence it 
appears to be 8 to 9%,
18 although many economists and financial managers would forecast a 
lower figure”. They also mentioned that “Many financial managers and economists believe that 
long-run historical returns are the best measure available”.  
In (2003, 7
th edition, page 160), they continued without official position, and believing in the 
range of 6 to 8.5%. On page 195, they said: “How about the market risk premium? As we have 
pointed out in the last chapter, we can’t measure EEP with precision. From past evidence it 
appears to be about 9%,
19 although many economists and financial managers would forecast a 
lower figure. Let’s use 8% in this example”.  
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2005), on page 154 of the 8
th edition say “Brealey, Myers and Allen 
have no official position on the exact market risk premium, but we believe that a range of 5 to 
8.5 percent is reasonable for the risk premium in the United States”.
20 
2.2. Copeland, Koller and Murrin (McKinsey) 
In the two first editions (1990 and 1995), the McKinsey book advised to use a REP = geometric 
HEP versus Government T-Bonds. However, they changed criteria in the 3
rd and 4
th editions: 
they advised to use the arithmetic HEP of 2-year returns versus Government T-Bonds reduced 
by a survivorship bias. Although in the 2
nd edition they said that (page 268) “we use a 
geometric average of rates of return because arithmetic averages are biased by the measurement 
period”, they used arithmetic averages in the 3
rd and 4
th editions. 
                                              
17 They said on pages 119 of (1984), 127 of (1988) and 131 of (1991) that “the crucial assumption here is that there 
is a normal, stable risk premium on the market portfolio, so that the expected future risk premium can be measured 
by the average past risk premium. One could quarrel with this assumption, but at least it yields estimates of the 
market return that seem sensible.” 
18 They reported on page 156 the arithmetic HEP versus the T-Bills in the period 1926-1997 (9.2%). 
19 They reported on page 155 the arithmetic HEP versus the T-Bills in the period 1926-2000 according to Ibbotson 
(9.1%). 
20 “It seems that the expected market return over this period was 9.4%, or 5.3% above the risk-free interest rate. 
This is 2.3% lower than the realized risk premium in the period 1900-2003.” The average market return that they 
used was (page 149) 11.7% (figures from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton).  
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In the 1
st edition (1990), they recommended 5-6% (page 193) and used a REP of 6% (page 205) 




nd edition (1995) they recommended 5-6% (page 268)
22 and used a REP of 5.5% 
(page 281). 
In the 3
rd edition (2000, page 221), they recommended 4.5-5% (page 221) and used a REP of 5% 
(page 231). They justify their recommendation as follows: “It is unlikely that the U.S. Market 
index will do as well over the next century as it has in the past, so we adjust downward the 
historical arithmetic average market risk premium. If we subtract a 1.5 to 2% survivorship 
bias
23 from the long-term arithmetic average of 6.5%, we conclude that the market risk 
premium should be in the 4.5-5%
24 range”. 
In the 4
th edition of the McKinsey valuation book, Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005, page 
297) state that the REP is equal to the EEP and say on page 298: “we believe that the market 
risk premium as of year-end 2003 was just under 5%”. On page 539 they use in an example a 
REP of 4.8%. On page 303, they argue that “Since it is unlikely that the U.S. stock market index 
will replicate its performance over the next century, we adjust downward the historical 
arithmetic average market risk premium. Using data from Jorion and Goetzmann, we find that 
between 1926 and 1996, the U.S. arithmetic annual return exceeded the median return on a set 
of 11 countries with continuous histories dating to the 1920s by 1.9% in real terms, or 1.4% 
in nominal terms. If we subtract a 1% to 2% survivorship bias from the long-term arithmetic 
average of 5.5 percent,
25 the difference implies the future range of the US market risk premium 
should be 3.5% to 4.5%”.  
2.3. Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 
In all editions they recommend REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP vs. T-Bills, using Ibbotson data. 
In (1988, 2
nd edition), they considered (pages 243-4) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus 
T-Bills for 1926-1988 = 8.5% (12.1%-3.6%) and used it on page 287.  
In (1993, 3
rd edition), they also recommended 8.5%.  
In (1996, 4
th edition), they considered (page 241) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus 
T-Bills for 1926-1994 = 8.5% (12.2%-3.7%) and used it on page 280. 
                                              
21 They report on page 194 the geometric HEP versus the T-Bonds in the period 1926-1988 according to Ibbotson 
(5.4%). 
22 Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1995, 2
nd ed., page 268):“We recommend using a 5 to 6% market risk premium for 
US companies. This is based on the long-run geometric average risk premium for the return of the S&P 500 versus 
the return on long-term government bonds from 1926 to 1992”. 
23 They refer to two papers about survivorship bias: Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) and Jorion and Goetzmann 
(1999). Survivorship biaswas identified by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) as one of the main reasons why the 
results based on historical analyses can be too optimistic. They pointed out that the observed return, conditioned on 
survival  (HEP), can overstate the unconditional expected return (EEP). However, Li and Xu (2002) show that the 
“survival bias” fails to explain the equity premium puzzle: “To have high survival bias, the probability of market 
survival over the long run has to be extremely small, which seems to be inconsistent with existing historical evidence”. 
24 6.5% is the arithmetic HEP of 2-year returns in the period 1926-1998 (see page 220). The arithmetic HEP of 1-year 
returns was 7.5%, and the geometric HEP was 5.9%. 
25 5.5% is the arithmetic mean of 10-year holding periods returns from 1903 to 2002. The arithmetic mean of 1-year 
returns is 6.2%, according to exhibit 10.5 of Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005).  
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In (1999, 5
th edition), they considered (page 259) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus 
T-Bills for 1926-1997 = 9.2% (13%-3.8%) and used it on page 261. They argued that “It is 
generally argued that the best estimate for the risk premium in the future is the average 
risk premium in the past”.  
In (2002, 6
th edition), they considered (page 259) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus 
T-Bills for 1926-1999 = 9.5% (13.3%-3.8%) and used it on pages 274 and 324. They 
mentioned (1999 in page 259; 2002 in page 273) that “financial economists use [the HEP] 
as the best estimate to occur in the future. We will use it frequently in the text”. 
In (2005, 7
th edition), they considered (page 259) that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP versus T-Bills 
for 1926-2002 = 8.4% (12.2%-3.8%) because “financial economists find this to be a useful 
estimate of the difference to occur in the future”.
26 However, on page 286 they used a REP = 8%. 
2.4. Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
In (1993, 2
nd edition, page 549), they used a REP = EEP = 6.5% (14.5%-8%) to value Hewlett-
Packard. They justified it by saying “Suppose the consensus forecast for the expected rate of 
return on the market portfolio in 1990 was about 14.5%”.
27  
In the 3




th edition (2002, page 575), they valued Motorola using a REP = 6.5% (12.5%-6%).
29 
In the 6
th edition (2003), they used CRSP data to calculate the arithmetic HEP vs. T-bills for 
1926-2001, which was 8.64% (12.49%-3.85%). They said on page 157 that “the instability 
of average excess return over the 19-year sub-periods calls into question the precision of the 
76-year average HEP (8.64%) as an estimate of the EEP… There is an emerging consensus that 
the HEP is an unrealistic high estimate of the EEP”. They used in the examples different REPs: 
8% (pages 426, 431) and 5% (page 415). 
2.5. Damodaran 
In 1994 and 2002 Damodaran recommended REP = EEP = geometric HEP versus T-bonds. In 
1997 he used a REP = arithmetic HEP versus T-Bills. In 2001a and 2006 he recommended REP = 
EEP = IEP.  
                                              
26 But they finish with a caveat on page 284: “of course, the future equity risk premium could be higher or lower 
than the historical equity risk premium. This could be true if future risk is higher or lower than past risk or if 
individual risk aversions are higher or lower than those of the past”. 
27 It is not clear how they got the 14.5%. They presented (pages 126 and 127) CRSP historical data for 1926-1990. 
The average arithmetic returns were: 12.13% for stocks, 4.9% for T-Bonds and 3.73% for T-Bills. 
28 They argue that “the HEP has been closer to 8.5%. However, stock analysts were relatively pessimistic about 
market performance over the short term. Although the HEP is a guide to the EEP one might expect from the market, 
there is no reason that the risk premium cannot vary somewhat from period to period”. The 8.5% that they 
mentioned was the arithmetic HEP using T-Bills in the period 1926-1993. 
29 They argue that “the HEP has been closer to 9.14%. However, after several banner years, stock analysts in mid-
2000 were increasingly wary about future market performance over the short term. Although the HEP is one guide as 
to the EEP one might expect from the market, there is no reason that the risk premium cannot vary somewhat from 
period to period. Moreover, recent research suggests that in the last 50 years the HEP was considerably better then 
the market participants at the time were anticipating. Such a pattern could indicate that the economy performed 
better than initially anticipated during this period, or that the discount rate declined”. The 9.14% that they 
mentioned was the arithmetic HEP using T-Bonds in the period 1926-1999.  
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Damodaran on Valuation (1994, page 22), recommended an EEP of 5.5%, the HEP (geometric 
mean using T-bonds) for the period 1926-1990: “The premium of 5.50% is used through the 
book for calculating expected returns”. However, on page 24, he calculated the cost of equity of 
Pepsico using a REP of 6.41% (geometric HEP 1926-1990 using T-Bills). For Germany 
(page 164) he used a REP of 3.3%.  
Damodaran on Valuation (2006, 2
nd edition) used a REP of 4% for the US. He said that the most 
relevant historical figure is the geometric HEP versus T-Bonds, that for the period 1928-2004, 
was 4.84%. He used a dividend discount model to conclude that “the implied premium for the 
US and the average implied equity risk premium has been between about 4% over the past 
40 years”. 
Damodaran (2001a, page 63) recommended “6.05%, which is the geometric average premium 
for stocks over treasury bonds from 1928 to 1999 if you use historical premiums. In using this 
premium, however, you are assuming that there are no trends in the risk premium and that 
investors today demand premiums similar to those they used to demand two, four, or six 
decades ago. Given the changes that have occurred in the markets and in the investor base over 
the last century, you should have serious concerns about using this premium, especially in the 
context of valuation”. But Damodaran (2001a, page 67) concluded: “The average implied equity-
risk premium between 1970 and 2000 is approximately 4%. By using this premium, you are 
assuming that while markets might have been overvalued in some of these years and 
undervalued in others, it has been, on average, correct over this period”. Throughout his book, 
Damodaran (2001a) used a REP = 4% for the U.S. 
Damodaran (2001b), however, used a REP of 5.5% (see, for example, pages 237, 339, 425 and 
426). On the first edition (1997), he already used a REP of 5.5% for the US in most of the 
examples, but on page 128 he calculated the cost of equity of Pepsico using a REP of 8.41% 
(arithmetic HEP 1926-1990 using T-Bills).  
Damodaran (2001c) mentioned (page 192) that although the geometric HEP versus T-bonds 
from Ibbotson for 1926-1998 (6.38%), “in this book we use a premium of 5.5% in most of the 
examples involving US companies”. But he continued in a footnote “we must confess that this 
is more for the sake of continuity with the previous version of the book and for purposes of 
saving a significant amount of reworking practice problems and solutions”. 
Damodaran (Investment Valuation, 2002, pages 170, 171) used a REP = HEP = 5.51% for US, 
which is the geometric HEP versus T-bonds in the period 1928-2000 according to the Federal 
Reserve Bank. On page 174 he argued that “the market correction in 2000 pushed the implied 
equity premium up to 2.87% by the end of 2000” and suggested an equation for the 
implied equity premium between 1960 and 2000: 
Implied equity premium = 1.87% + 0.2903 (T-bond rate) – 0.1162 (T-bond – T-bill).
30 
In the first edition (1996), he used (page 251) a REP of 5.5% to value Boeing. On page 48, he 
shows that 5.5% is the geometric HEP versus T-bonds in the period 1926-1990. 
                                              
30 Damodaran provides the R-squared of the regression (49%) and the t-statistics of the coefficients (5.94 and 1.10 
respectively).  
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2.6. Copeland and Weston 
In (1979, page 295), they used a REP = 10% (17%-7%), and on page 321 they used 9.83%. In 
their 3
rd edition (1988) they used the same values (see pages 458 and 531). 
Weston and Copeland (1992, page 407), used a REP = 5% (9%-4%), and on page 944 a REP = 
5% (11%-6%). 
2.7. Van Horne 
In (1968, 1
st edition, page 215), he still did not mention the CAPM or the market risk premium. 
In (1983, 6
th ed.ition, page 215), he used a REP = 6% (13% - 7%). He justified it: “Suppose, for 
easy illustration, that the expected risk-free rate is an average of the risk-free rates that 
prevailed over the ten-year period and that the expected market return is average of market 
returns over that period”. 
In (1986, page 373), he mentioned that “for the expected return of the market portfolio of 
stocks, one can use consensus estimates of security analysts, economists, and others who 
regularly predict such returns. Merrill, Lynch and other investment banks make these 
predictions”. 
In (1992, Fundamentals, 8
th ed., page 438), he used a REP = 5% (13% - 8%). He justified it: 
“Assume that a rate of return of about 13% on stocks in general is expected to prevail and that 
a risk-free rate of 8% is expected”. He added: “the ‘before hand’ or ex ante market risk 
premium has ranged from 3 to 7%”. 
2.8. Penman 
In (2001, 1
st ed.ition, page 692), he said that “the market risk premium is a big guess. Research 
papers and textbooks estimate it in the range of 4.5% to 9.2%. Pundits keen to rationalize the 
‘high’ stock market at the end of the 1990s were brave enough to state that it had declined 
to 2%... Compound the error in beta and the error in the risk premium and you have a 
considerable problem… No one knows what the market risk premium is”.  
In (2003, 2
nd ed., page 445), he admitted that “we really do not have a sound method to estimate 
the cost of capital… Estimates [of the equity premium] range, in texts and academic research, 
from 3.0% to 9.2%”, and he used 6% (page 443). 
2.9. Other finance textbooks and valuation books 
Weston and Brigham (1968) still did not defined equity premium, but they defined the cost of 
equity (page 189) as “the minimum rate of return that must be earned to keep unchanged the 
value of the existing common equity”. In (1982, 6
th edition, page 393) they said that “the market 
risk premium can be considered relatively stable at 5 to 6% for practical application”.   
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Weston, Chung and Siu (1997) recommend 7.5%. 
Bodie and Merton (2000) use 8% for USA.
31 
Stowe, Robinson, Pinto and McLeavey (2002), in their book for the CFA (Chartered Financial 
Analysts) Program use (page 49) a REP = Geometric HEP using T-Bonds during 1926-2000, 
according to Ibbotson = 5.7%.
32 
Pratt (2002) affirms that “Cost of capital is the expected rate of return that the market requires 
in order to attract funds to a particular investment”. He assumes that REP = EEP = HEP and 
he uses 7.4% (page 68) and 8% (page 74) and 8.10%. 
Hawawini and Viallet (2002) use (page 328) a REP = 6.2% = geometric HEP over T-bonds in 
the period 1926-1999 according to Ibbotson. 
Fernandez (2002) is the only finance textbook that claims that “it is impossible to determine 
the premium for the market as a whole, because it does not exist. Even if we knew the market 
premiums of the different investors who operated on the market, it would be meaningless to talk 
of a premium for the market as a whole”. He also mentions that we “could only talk of a market 
risk premium if all investors had the same cash flow expectations”. “If they did, it would make 
sense to talk of a market risk premium because all investors would have the market portfolio. 
However, expectations are not homogeneous”. 
Fernandez (2004, 2001) also mentioned that “the HEP, the EEP and the REP are different 
concepts” and that “different investors have different REPs”. In the examples (see pages 608 and 
623) he uses REP = 4%. 
Weston, Mitchel and Mulherin (2004) mention that the arithmetic HEP over T-bonds in the 
period 1926-2000 according to Ibbotson was 7.3%, while the geometric was 5.7%. In page 260 
they use REP = EEP = 7%. 
Bruner (2004, pages 269 and 294) uses a required equity premium of 6% because (see page 
265) “from 1926 to 2000, the risk premium for common stocks has averaged about 6% when 
measured geometrically”. 
Arzac (2005) uses (see exhibit 3.4) a required equity premium of 5.08% for a valuation done in 
December 2002 (5.08% is the expected equity premium as of that date calculated using the 
Gordon equation). 
                                              
31 On page 347, they say that “in the CAPM, the equilibrium risk premium on the market portfolio is equal to the 
variance of the market portfolio (σ
2
M) times a weighted average of the degree of risk aversion of the holders of 
wealth (A). Suppose that σM = 20% and A = 2. Then the risk premium on the market portfolio is 8%.” The CAPM 
tells us that asset prices are a function of the risk aversion of the representative investor and of the variance-
covariance structure of the universe of assets. If the form of the utility function and the coefficient of risk aversion 
are both known, then knowledge of the variance-covariance of the universe of assets (or the variance of the portfolio 
of risky assets) is sufficient to identify the spread between risky and riskless asset portfolios.  
32 They also mention another method to calculate the cost of equity: the “bond yield plus risk premium method”. 
Under this approach, the cost of equity is equal to the “yield to maturity on the company’s long-term debt plus a 
typical risk premium of 3-4%, based on experience.”  
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REP = HEP  vs. T-Bills  vs. T-Bonds 
Arithmetic 
Brealey and Myers (1984, 1988, 1991, 
1996)  
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1988, 1993, 
1996, 1999, 2002, 2005); Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus (2003); Pratt (2002) 
Weston, Mitchel & Mulherin (2004)  
Arithmetic - survivor bias     McKinsey (2000, 2005); Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus (1996)  
Geometric    
McKinsey (1990, 1995); Damodaran 
(1994, 1996, 1997, 2001b, 2001c, 
2002, 2006); Stowe et al. (2002); 
Hawawini and Viallet (2002); Bruner 
(2004) 
    
REP = IEP  Damodaran (2001a); Arzac (2005) 
“No oficial position”   Brealey and Myers (2000, 2003, 2005)  
“Different investors have different REPs”  Fernandez (2001, 2002, 2004) 
“No one knows what the REP is”  Penman (2003) 
3. There is no a REP for the market as a whole 
We claim that the confusion about the Equity Premium comes from the fact that there is not a 
REP for the market as a whole: different investors use different REP. The same could be said 
about IEP: different investors have different IEPs. A unique IEP requires assuming homogeneous 
expectations for the expected growth (g), but there are several pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy current 
prices. 
Similarly, for having an EEP common for all investors we need to assume homogeneous 
expectations (or a representative investor) and, with our knowledge of financial markets, this 
assumption is not reasonable. A theory with a representative investor cannot explain either 
why the annual trading volume of most exchanges more than double the market capitalization. 
We can find out an investor’s REP by asking him, although for many investors the REP is not 
an explicit parameter but, rather, an implicit one that manifests in the price they are prepared 
to pay for shares. However, it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, 
because it does not exist. Even if we knew the REPs of all the investors in the market, it would 
be meaningless to talk of a REP for the market as a whole.  
The rationale for this is to be found in the aggregation theorems of microeconomics, which in 
actual fact are non-aggregation theorems. One model that works well individually for a number 
of people may not work for all of the people together.
33 
                                              
33 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say, “it is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by a 
representative consumer, this representative consumer’s preferences have normative contents. It may even be the case 
that a positive representative consumer exists but that there is no social welfare function that leads to a normative 
representative consumer.” For the CAPM, this means that although the CAPM may be a valid model for each 
investor, it is not valid for the market as a whole, because investors do not have the same return and risk 
expectations for all shares. Prices are a statement of expected cash flows discounted at a rate that includes the 
risk premium. Different investors have different cash flow expectations and different future risk expectations. One 
could only talk of a equity premium if all investors had the same cash flow expectations.   
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 13 
4. How do I calculate the REP? 
For calculating the cost of equity (required return to equity cash flows) of a company, a 
valuator has to answer to the following question: which differential rate over current T-Bond 
yields do I think that compensates the risk of holding the shares? If there is only an owner of 
the shares, we can ask him directly the question. But if it is a traded company, the valuator has 
to do a prudential judgment.  
We need the cost of equity to discount the expected equity cash flows of the company. Note 
that there is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that 
different valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most 
authors look for a unique discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are 
formed in a democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any 
market, different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different 
evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates). Then, in the case of a traded 
company, there are investors that think that the company is undervalued (and buy or hold 
shares), investors that think that the company is overvalued (and sell or not buy shares), and 
investors that think that the company is fairly valued (and sell or hold shares). The investors 
that did the last trade, or the rest of the investors that held or did not have shares do not have a 
common REP (nor common expectations of equity cash flows). 
For calculating the REP, we must answer the same question, but thinking in a diversified 
portfolio of shares, instead in just the shares of a company. In the valuations that I have done 
in the 21
st century I have used REPs between 3.8 and 4% for Europe and for the U.S. Given the 
yields of the T-Bonds, I think
34 that an additional 4% compensates the additional risk of a 
diversified portfolio.  
5. Conclusion 
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium 
and risk premium), is one of the most important, discussed but elusive parameters in finance. 
Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used to designate 
four different concepts (although many times they are mixed): Historical equity premium (HEP), 
Expected equity premium (EEP): Required equity premium (REP) and Implied equity 
premium (IEP).  
The four concepts are different. The HEP is equal for all investors, but the REP, the EEP and the 
IEP are different for different investors. There is no an IEP for the market as a whole: different 
investors have different IEPs  and use different REPs. A unique IEP requires assuming 
homogeneous expectations for the expected growth (g), but there several pairs (IEP, g) that 
satisfy current prices. 
We show that in the finance and valuation textbooks, there are authors that claim different 
identities among the four equity premiums defined above: some claim that HEP = EEP = REP; 
others claim that EEP is smaller than HEP; others claim that there is a unique IEP and that 
REP = IEP; others “have no official position”; others affirm “that no one knows what the REP 
is”. We claim that “different investors have different REPs” and that “it is impossible to 
determine the REP for the market as a whole, because it does not exist”.
  
                                              
34 And also my clients that are able to answer to that question.  
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